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NOTES
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN MISSOURI:
JUDICIAL ABROGATION AND
LEGISLATIVE REENACTMENT
Government immunity' is a legal doctrine that pits legal theorists2
against political pragmatists in a debate of national dimensions. 3 Ju-
1. "Immunity" should be distinguished from "privilege." The holder of a privilege-for
e\ample. the privilege of self-defense-avoids liability for what would otherwise be tortious con-
duct because the circumstances surrounding that conduct would make it unjust or unreasonable to
impose liability. It is sometimes argued that privilege differs from immunity only as a matter of
degree. Judicial officers, for example, hold an absolute privilege against liability for acts commit-
ted within the scope of their authority, even though their acts may have been malicious or corrupt.
Rather than say that judicial officers possess an absolute privilege to act as they will, it is prefera-
ble to say that they are immune from liability in tort. Immunity arises because of the status or
position of the defendant; "it does not deny the tort, but [denies] the resulting liability." W. PROS-
.,R, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895, Introductory Note at 392 (1979).
2. The classic critique of governmental immunity is found in a trilogy of articles by
Borchard: Government Liability in Fort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. I (1926); GovernmenalResponsibility in Tort: VII, 28 COLUNI. L. REV. 577
(1928). Nationally, two symposia have been influential: Governmental Tort Liability, 9 L. & CON-
TLMP. PROB. 181 (1942); Sovereign Immunity and Public Responsibility, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795.
Articles on te subject are legion and largely repetitive; certain of the more influential ones in-
dude: Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect
to the Common-Lan, Tort Liabilitv' of Municipal Corporations, 16 OR. L. REV. 250 (1937); Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountabilitror Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. I (1972);
Note,.An Insurance Program to Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunit, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
S9 (1973). Governmental immunity in Missouri is discussed in: Lauer, Municipal Law in Mis-
,ouri, 28 Mo. L. REV. 555 (1963); Littlefield, Stare Decisis, Prospective Overruling, and Judicial
Zg,.slation in the Context of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 56 (1964); Noel, Municpal
Tort Immunit v in Police Misconduct Lztigation: The Casefor Judicial Abrogration in Missouri, 18
Sr. Louis U.L.J. 602 (1974); Comment, Municpal "Governmental" Tort Immunity Doctrine in Mis-
,ouri, 27 Mo. L. REV. 224 (1962); Note, Governmental Immunityfrom Tort Liability. Has the
Rationale Disappeared, 39 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 252 (1971); 43 Mo. L. REv. 387 (1978).
3. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LIABIL-
ITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICI, iLS 99 (rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NAAG REPORT]:
The recent history of sovereign immunity and public official liability is characterized
by two basic themes: The caustic and continued criticism of immunity by courts and
commentators, and the steadfast unwillingness of legislators to subject the state (though
not necessarily its officials and employees) to liability similar to that of a private corpora-
tion or individual. In almost all instances in which a state court has abolished immunity,
the state legislature has either completely reinstated it or limited the liability statutorily.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note §§ 895B-895C at 12-22 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
(173),
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rists4 and commentators5 argue that "sovereign" immunity, typified by
the maxim "the king can do no wrong,"6 is paradoxical and theoreti-
cally unsupportable in a democratic republic.7 Opponents of the doc-
trine also contend that the historical distinction between a
municipality's governmental activities, which are immune from tort lia-
bility, and its proprietary activities, which are not immune, is often an
arbitrary distinction" ill-suited to the twin objectives of modem tort
law--distribution of risks9 and compensation of victims.' 0
Fearing that politically crippling tort judgments would quickly fol-
low abrogation of governmental tort immunity," legislatures have re-
acted to the courts and commentators with surprising unanimity by
codifying, at least in part, the common-law doctrine of governmental
immunity.' Missouri's recently enacted Tort Immunity Act'" is a ten-
tative attempt to resolve' 4 the tension between those who advocate total
4. See notes 7, 31 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246, quotedin Kramer, The Governmental Tort Ihn-
munity Doctrine in the United States from 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 802 n.3 1; see 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-69 (4th ed. 1956).
7. In O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the apparent paradox of adhering to the doctrine
of "sovereign.. immunity in a democratic republic:
Many of those who urge the abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity attribute its
origin to the theory that "the King can do no wrong," and then proceed to discredit the
doctrine by noting "the fact that the Revolutionary War was fought to abolish that 'di-
vine right of kings' on which the theory is based." We consider such exhortations irrele-
vant. In Missouri, the people are sovereign. The immunity is theirs.
521 S.W.2d at 407 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
(1970) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882)
(Governmental immunity is based on the general policy that "the supreme power in every State,
wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend
itself from assaults in those courts."). But see Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,359
P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (en banc); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 II. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
See generaly W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 970; Borchard, GovernmentalResponsibility in Tort, VI,
36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
8. See notes 52-55, 59-61 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 31 infra.
10. Id.
11. See notes 205-07 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 3 supra.
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600- .650 (1978). This Note will refer to the statute as the Tort
Immunity Act.
14. See note 170 infra and accompanying text.
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abrogation of the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity
and those who argue for its retention.
Part I of this Note surveys the case law of governmental immunity in
Missouri prior to the passage of the Tort Immunity Act, discusses the
problem of reasonably discriminating between governmental and non-
governmental activities, and explores the application of two litigation
options-nuisance and inverse condemnation-to situations in which
the public entity retains immunity. Part II analyzes the probable im-
pact of the Tort Immunity Act on traditionally governmental functions
and predicts the extent to which it will extend or broaden the public
entity's liability in tort. Part III then examines the Act's statutory pro-
visions to determine the scope of retained governmental immunity and
the adequacy of the Act's insurance options, and critically evaluates the
Act's conspicuous omissions.
This Note concludes that the Tort Immunity Act, although marred
by hasty omissions and ambiguities, 1" should effectively eliminate the
troublesome governmental-proprietary distinction. 6  Moreover, by
holding the "public entity" liable for certain tortious conduct, 17 the
statute will result in more adequate compensation of victims of govern-
mental torts than provided under the prior law.' 8
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN MISSOURI
A. Historical Overiiew
On January 19, 1816, the Third Territorial Assembly of Missouri
adopted the common law of England as it existed before 1607.19 In
1821 when Missouri attained statehood, its new constitution reaffirmed
the 1816 act,20 which then became the common law of Missouri.2 ' The
15. See notes 174, 187-93, 204-10 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 96, 128 infra and accompanying text.
17. The preamble to the Tort Immunity Act provides:
Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in this state
prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or modified by stat-
utes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the
immunity of the public entity from liability and suit for compensatory damages for neg-
ligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived in [two] instances ....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978).
18. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text.
19. See O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
865 (1975),
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (1978).
21. Elks Inv. Co. v. Jones, 187 S.W. 71, 74 (Mo. 1916).
Number 3]
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scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Missouri, therefore, can be
traced back to its common-law origins. The case most influential in the
common-law development of the doctrine is Russell v. The Men of
Devon,"2 a 1788 English case. In Russell an individual brought suit
against the residents of an unincorporated English county to recover
for damages caused by the county's negligence. The court declared the
county immune from suit,"3 presumably because the county lacked
funds to satisfy a judgment.2 4
Technically, Russell is not a part of Missouri common law because it
was decided subsequent to the corpus adopted in 1816;25 nevertheless, a
minority of states, including Missouri, considers the decision as a most
important opinion for the principle that an "action cannot be main-
tained for negligence against the public. ' 26 Because this principle dates
back to the period of common law adopted by Missouri, even though
the decision itself does not, Russell, in effect, represents Missouri com-
mon law on sovereign immunity.
The Russell principle served as the theoretical support for translating
the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity into the
22. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
23. Id. at 362. The Russell court cited a case reported before 1558 as authority for its holding
that the action could not be maintained. "'[Tlhere is no law or reason for supporting the action;
and there is a precedent against it in Brooke: though even without that authority I should be of
opinion that this action cannot be maintained.'" Id, quotedin O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d
403, 406 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). A Wyoming court also noted the
Russell court's reliance on Brooke's abridgment:
While we have been unable to find the full report of the case abridged by Brooke, the
language used by the opinion writers in the Devon case clearly indicates that antecedent
to Russell v. The Men of Devon. . .a previous judicial pronouncement had recognized
the doctrine of municipal immunity. We do find, however, in II Holdsworth's History of
English Law, 3d ed., p. 545, a reference stating the author of Brooke's Abridgements
died in 1558. So it is clear the early decision Brooke abridged was made before that
year.
Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 43, 338 P.2d 808, 810-11 (1959).
24. See generally W. PROSSER, sufpra note 1, at 978.
25. The corpus adopted by Missouri in the 1816 act only included decisions through 1607;
thus, Russell, decided in 1788, does not fall within the adopted body of common law. See text
accompanying note 19 supra.
26. 521 S.W.2d at 407. The majority of states argue that although Russell contained the
historical roots of governmental immunity, it did not apply an already established principle of law
because the common law adopted by the American states does not include Russell; thus, its use as
precedent constitutes judicial legislation. As judge-made law, the majority position advocates ag-
gressive judicial abrogration of the doctrine of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). See generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 978; Kramer, supra note 6, at 811.
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American doctrine of state governmental immunity.27 Among the
state's political subdivisions, however, common law distinguished mu-
nicipal corporations from quasi-corporations.2 Only the latter, which
included counties, townships, school districts, and special districts, en-
joyed full immunity; 9 municipal corporations, like private corpora-
tions, remained liable for the torts of their agents and employees under
the theory of respondeat superior.3" The first American case to recog-
nize the tort liability of a municipal corporation qua corporation was
Hooe . 41exandria.3 Forty years later Bailey v. Mayor of New York32
became the first tort liability case to bifurcate the municipal corpora-
tion into "governmental" and "proprietary" elements: a municipal cor-
27. 521 S.W.2d at 407.
28. See Kramer. supra note 6. at 810-21.
29, Id. at 812-13.
30, Judge Friendly provided a classic definition of this theory of liability:
[Rjespondeat superior, even within its traditional limits, rests not so much on policy
grounds consistent with the governing principles of tort law as in a deeply rooted senti-
ment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which
may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. 12 F. Cas. 462 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667). A discussion of the competing policy argu-
ments for and against governmental immunity is beyond the scope of this Note. Briefly, however,
various substantive arguments advanced in favor of state tort immunity include:
the absurdity of a wrong committed by an entire people; the idea that whatever the State
did must be lawful; the dubious theory that any agent of the State was always outside of
his authority when he committed any wrongful act; reluctance to divert public funds to
compensate for private injuries: and the inconvenience and embarrassment that would
descend upon the State government if it should be subjected to the litigation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, Comment a, at 401 (1979). For state subdivisions,
Prosser suggests four rationales and Kramer offers several other justifications. W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, at 978; Kramer, supra note 6, at 812-13. Essentially, these authors argue: (1) state funds,
derived as not-for-profit from municipal functions, should be expended on public purposes rather
than to compensate private injuries; (2) a political subdivision should share in the state's govern-
mental immunity when it acts primarily on behalf of the state for the benefit of state citizens
rather than to benefit its own inhabitants, see. e.g., Krueger v. Board of Educ., 310 Mo. 239, 274
S.W. 811 (1925); and (3) liability could either bankrupt the political subdivision or inhibit the
zealous performance of its discretionary duties, see, e.g., Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d
483, 486 (Mo. 1972).
Critics of immunity for political subdivisions typically reject the Bailey bifurcation, see note 33
infra, and argue that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply equally to public corpora-
tions and to private corporations, see note 30 supra. The dominant argument against municipal
immunity is that the government is a more equitable loss-spreader; ie., that tort judgments, as a
cost of administering government, should be borne by the public through taxation rather than
,houldered solely by the injured individual. See W. PROSSER, supra note I, at 978; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895, Introductory Note at 394-95 (1979); Note, The State as Party Defend-
ant.' Abrogration of So'ereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 MD. L. Rev. 653, 664 (1977).
32. 3 Hill & Den. 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
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poration would be held liable for torts in the exercise of its proprietary,
but not its governmental, functions.33
Missouri adopted the Bailey doctrine in 1860 in Murtaugh v. City of
St. Louis.34  The court distinguished governmental from proprietary
functions by the nature of the benefit to be derived from the govern-
mental activity. An activity intended to further the public's good en-
joyed immunity as a governmental function, but an activity designed to
confer a localized benefit could give rise to liability as a proprietary
function.35  The doctrine phrased the principles that guided the devel-
opment in Missouri of a body of law that distinguished a political sub-
division's governmental functions, which served the public's good,
from its proprietary functions, which unequally benefited its own resi-
dents. Governmental activities enjoyed immunity, but proprietary
functions did not.36 By the end of the nineteenth century a majority of
states subscribed to the Bailey doctrine.37
Despite the acceptance in Murtaugh of the governmental-proprietary
distinction, a latent hostility to immunity continued to exist in Mis-
souri.38 Seven times in the past fifteen years the Missouri Supreme
33. Barnett, supra note 2, at 268-69; Kramer, supra note 6, at 816. The effect of this bifurca-
tion is to carve out a category of functions, label it "governmental," and confer immunity where
liability previously existed. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 268-69; Kramer, supra note 6, at 816.
Proceeding from the premise that municipal corporations traditionally shared the state's govern-
mental immunity, Judge Dillon offered an alternate and conflicting analysis of the origins of the
governmental-proprietary bifurcation. Judge Dillon saw the bifurcation as an attempt to promote
justice by carving out a category of functions labeled "proprietary" for which the municipality was
liable in tort. I J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 184 (5th ed. 1911). In support of Judge
Dillon's analysis, see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Missouri case law
in 1865 also supported Judge Dillon's view. Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555 (1865),
stood for the proposition that entities, "created by the Legislature for purposes of public policy,
are not responsible for the neglect of duties enjoined of them unless the action is given by the
statute." Id. at 562-63.
34. 44 Mo. 479 (1869).
35. The Murtaugh court reasoned:
[W]here the officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power
conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit, and injury ensues from negligence
or misfeasance of such officer or servant, the corporation is liable, as in the case of pri-
vate corporations or parties; but when the acts or omissions complained of were done or
omitted in the exercise of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the
public good, and not for private corporate advantage, then the corporation is not liable
for the consequence of such acts or omissions on the part of its officers and servants.
Id. at 480.
36. Id.
37. Kramer, supra note 6, at 816.
38. Nationally, the issue of governmental immunity became volatile. The drafters of the
Restatement of Torts went so far as to claim a "definite modern trend" toward abrogation of
[Vol. 1979:865
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Court had to address frontal assaults on governmental immunity.3 9
The seventh assault, Jones v. State Highway Commission,40 proved de-
cisive when the majority essentially adopted Judge Finch's passionately
reasoned dissent4' from O'Dell v. School District.42 Plaintiff in Jones
sought damages for personal injuries suffered in an automobile acci-
dent allegedly caused by the negligent design and maintenance of a
state highway.43 The court prospectively abrogated the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity against tort liability for all claims arising on or after
August 15, 1978."
Jones was not so much a watershed as it was a catalyst. Within nine
months of the decision the Missouri legislature passed House Bill No.
165041 entitled, "An Act relating to asserting claims against the state
and its political subdivisions for tortious conduct. '46  This bill reen-
immunity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note §§ 895A-895J (1979).
Notwithstanding the drafters' analysis, the only legitimate trend has been for courts to abrogate
governmental immunity just to have the state legislature quickly reinstate it. See NAAG REPORT,
supra note 3. The recent demise of charitable immunity in Missouri, announced in Abernathy v.
Sisters cSt. ,ary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969) (en banc), is a further indication of judicial
hostility to immunities generically.
39. See Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); O'Dell v.
School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Payne v. County
of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1972); Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1971);
Glenn v. Department of Corrections, 434 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1968); Smith v. Consolidated School
Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966); Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963).
40. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en bane).
41. In 1975 the four-member O'Dell majority, although admitting that the common law of
governmental immunity needed modernizing, argued that the doctrine was legislatively enacted,
theoretically supportable, frequently reaffirmed, and clearly a legislative question. The three-
member O'Dell minority voiced its unwillingness to wait any longer for action from what it per-
ceived to be an apathetic and lethargic legislature. Two years later the O'Dell minority attained
majority status. Judge Rendlen, who replaced the departing Judge Holman, one member of the
O'Dell majority, provided the swing vote in the new four-to-three Jones majority.
42. 521 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
43. 557 S.W.2d at 226-27; see 43 Mo. L. REV. 387 (1978).
44. Prospective abrogation is not unusual in sovereign immunity cases. See, e.g., Evans v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) (en bane); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 1562, 261 A.2d
896 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). See generally
Note, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888. The
court in Jones explained: "In order that an orderly transition be made, that adequate financial
planning take place, that governmental units have time to adjust their practices and that the legis-
lature be afforded an opportunity to consider the subject in general, the doctrine is abrograted
prospectively." 557 S.W.2d at 231.
45. On June 8, 1978, the Bill was signed into law.
46. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600- .650 (1978).
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acted the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity as it existed
in Missouri immediately prior to Jones, but with two important excep-
tions.4 7 Caught between a court bent on abrogation and a coalition of
political subdivisions lobbying for complete reinstatement of the com-
mon law,48 the legislature ultimately chose a middle course-the elimi-
nation of governmental immunity in those areas in which compensable
public injury is most likely to occur.49 Specifically, immunity is waived
for injuries directly resulting from the negligent use of motor vehicles
by public employees in the course of their employment50 and for inju-
ries caused by the public entity's negligent failure to maintain its prop-
erty in a safe condition.5
B. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction: A Problem of Labeling
The political entity in its several manifestations-state, quasi-corpo-
ration, and municipal corporation-performs a multitude of functions
that do not fall neatly into categories labeled "immune" or "liable."
Consequently, the courts must first distill the essence of the function
and then formulate the category. Unfortunately, courts too often shirk
this duty and succumb to labeling, substituting talismanic words for
principled explanation. 2 Designation of one set of functions as "gov-
ernmental" or "discretionary" and another set as "proprietary" or
47. Id. § 537.600. See note 17 supra.
48. Letter from J. Anthony Dill, Missouri State Representative, to Michael S. Anderson, Oc-
tober 30, 1978, on file with the Washington University Law Quarteri.
49. Id.
50. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600(1) (1978) provides: "Injuries directly resulting from the negli-
gent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of operation of motor vehicles within the
course of their employment."
51. Id. § 537.600(2) provides:
Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes
that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury
directly resulted from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that
either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within
the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the
injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
52. Missouri decisions are replete with language similar to that used in Catalano v. Kansas
City, 475 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), in which a ten-year-old boy brought an action for
injuries sustained when he stepped on a piece of broken bottle on the city's playground. The court
stated: "It is conceded that the defendant City operated this park in a proprietary capacity and
that it is required to exercise ordinary care to maintain such park in a reasonably safe condition."
Id. at 426-27. The court did not explain why the city conceded this duty. From the context, it
would appear that parks qua parks are proprietary; however, the thrust of the concession is that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/15
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"'ministerial" presumes the point at issue and predictably results in ar-
bitrary application of the law. 3
Attempting to avoid arbitrary applications of law, Missouri struc-
tured its common law of governmental immunity around an organizing
principle: when the political entity exercises its police power, acting "in
the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare,"54 it is immune
from liability in tort. The term "police power," however, is a nebulous
and potentially all-embracing concept open to the same criticisms
about labeling." In Dallas t. City ofSt. Louis,5 6 for example, the wife
of a decedent municipal employee, who was fatally injured while serv-
icing a city garbage truck in the municipal garage, brought a wrongful
death action against the municipality. Elaborating on the police power
concept,- 7 the court succeeded only in muddying the waters when it
reasoned that a municipal activity that duplicates services available in
the marketplace is a proprietary activity."
the park was a city park. If it had been a county park, the activity would have been deemed
governmental. See notes 69-73 infra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., notes 61, 84 infra.
54. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Mo. 1964).
55. Its potential for overinclusiveness is what renders "police power" an ineffective organiz-
ing principle. Sewer districts, the highway commission, penitentiaries, the state university, hospi-
tals, and many other entities have all successfully claimed immunity under the police power. See
notes 74-95 infra and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, use of a concept this amorphous has
produced highly arbitrary distinctions. In Hayes v. City of Kansas City, 362 Mo. 368, 241 S.W.2d
888 (1951), for example, the court held noncompensable injuries sustained by a plaintiff hit by a
truck that had been scooping garbage from the street, because the truck's activities came within
the city's police power, however, in Schweikert v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. Ct. App.
1962), the court awarded compensation to a plaintiff for injuries sustained when the city's street
cleaning truck rear-ended plaintiffs car. Indistinguishable as the cases seem to be, the Schweikert
court avoided the police power defense by tracing the accident to defective brakes on the truck,
which had been negligently repaired by the city's maintenance garage; thus, the court held the
injury' compensable within the Dallas doctrine. See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text.
The court reached an equally anomalous result in Myers v. City of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
1962), in which it held that the governmental immunity doctrine does not embrace snowplows
engaged in snow removal. Hajes and Myers, when read together, produce a most peculiar result:
if a city truck is shoveling garbage when it hits a person, the city is immune from liability; how-
ever, if the truck is shoveling snow, the injured person will have a cause of action against the city.
56. 338 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1960); accord, Wasserman v. Kansas City, 471 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.
1971) (en banc).
57. 338 S.W.2d at 44 (quoting Krueger v. Board of Educ., 310 Mo. 239, 248, 274 S.W. 811,
814 (1925)).
58. "[W]hen the city elected to own and operate a garage for the maintenance and repair of
its motor vehicles, it entered the area of proprietary functions, and not governmental, and may be
liable for the negligence of its employees in the operation of the garage." Id. See also Miller v.
Municipal Theatre Ass'n, 540 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), in which plaintiff-actress brought
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In Weiser v. Kansas City59 plaintiff suffered injury when a coem-
ployee stumbled on a negligently maintained rubber runner in City
Hall, the governmental seat for the municipality. Under common law
the city would not be liable to suit in tort because the city maintained
the property in its "governmental capacity." Fortunately for plaintiff,
however, the court found that the injury occurred in the Water Depart-
ment of City Hall, a statutorily "proprietary" department; conse-
quently, plaintiff could maintain the tort action.60 Under a functional
approach, liability would not turn on the definition of the political en-
tity whose property was involved.6'
Before Jones v. State Highway Commissioner6" Missouri courts, using
the same definitional analysis, conferred tort immunity on all quasi-
corporate political subdivisions. The Bureau of the Census classifies
state political subdivisions by five major types: 63 counties, 64 municipal-
ities, 65 townships, 66 school districts,67 and special districts.6 8 All types,
an action for physical injuries caused by the city's negligent maintenance of the Municipal Thea-
tre's premises. The city, implicitly conceding that it was engaged in a proprietary activity, did not
deny the negligence; rather, it unsuccessfully sought to establish that plaintiff was an employee,
not an independent contractor, and thus was required to sue for workers' compensation.
59. 481 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
60. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
61. Consideration of Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965), will
clarify the distinction. In Harvey plaintiff sustained injuries allegedly caused by the negligent
maintenance by defendant-park district of its playground facilities. The trial court dismissed the
suit on the ground that the park district was immune by definition under the controlling statute;
that is, a park district qua park district could not be sued in tort. The Illinois Supreme Court held
that this classification denied plaintiff equal protection of the laws. The court reasoned that, "[lit
is feasible, and it may be thought desirable, to classify in terms of types of municipal function,
instead of classifying among different governmental agencies that perform the same function." Id.
at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
62. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
63. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
38 (1977); see I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL OR-
GANIZATION 1-6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION].
64. Counties, as the basic governmental building block, were designed in a then-predomi-
nantly rural society to carry out certain state-based governmental functions; e.g., the administra-
tion of justice, the assessment and collection of taxes, and the provision of basic services such as
roads and keeping the peace. Counties, however, do not generally possess legislative powers. D.
MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 63, at 39; GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, Supra note 63,
at 41-42.
65. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 63, at 39. "[A] municipality is a political
subdivision within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide general local
government for a specific population concentration in a defined area." Id.
66. Id. at 41. "As distinguished from municipalities. . . townships exist to serve inhabitants
of areas defined without regard to population concentrations." Townships, which generally pro-
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except municipalities, are quasi-corporate by definition. The defini-
tional approach, by immunizing all quasi-corporate entities, thus
removes a large segment of political activity from tort liability. More-
over, this approach creates a major incongruity: the quasi-corporation
of St. Louis County exercises all the powers of an urban government,
yet it enjoys immunity from torts for which the City of St. Louis would
be liable.69 In Coleman v. McNary,7 ° for example, plaintiff sued the St.
Louis County Supervisor for slander, disparagement, and tortious in-
terference with a contractual agreement.71 The court emphatically
stated that a municipal corporation is "protected only against claims
which arise from the exercise of [its] governmental function[s]," 72 but
"'a county is protected against all claims by sovereign immunity.' '7 3
In recent years the Missouri Supreme Court has applied the doctrine
of quasi-corporate governmental immunity to a school district, a met-
ropolitan sewer district, and the Missouri Highway Commission.
O'Dell v. School District74 represents the most recent restatement on
governmental immunity for school districts. The O'Dell court drew
heavily from Smith v. Consolidated School District,75 which noted that
vide a limited range of services for predominantly rural areas, appear in only 24 of Missouri's 115
counties. Some Missouri municipalities operate within territory that is also served by township
government. Id. at 40-41.
67. There are 870 school districts in Missouri. Each is "governed by an elected board of
directors authorized to levy taxes and issue bonds." GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, SUpra note
63, at 381.
68. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 63, at 42. "A majority of special districts are
established to perform a single function [including, e.g., cemeteries, fire protection, highways, hos-
pitals, housing and urban renewal, libraries, parks and recreation, school buildings, sewerage, and
urban water supply, id. at 44], but some have been given authority by their enabling legislation to
provide several kinds of services." Id. at 42.
69. St. Louis County is a charter county, governed by an elected county supervisor and
county council. The charter asserts that the county has "all powers possible for a county to have
under the constitution and laws of Missouri." ST. Louis COUNTY CHARTER art. 1, § 1.030 (1968).
See generalry 41 Mo. L. REv'. 49, 53-57 (1976) (discussing county home rule and the charter pow-
ers of St. Louis County).
70. 549 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
71. Id. at 569.
72. Id. at 570.
73. Id. See Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555, 562 (1865) (counties are "quasi corpo-
rations, created by the Legislature for purposes of public policy, [and] are not responsible for the
neglect of duties enjoined on them unless the action is given by the statute."); see, e.g., Payne v.
County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1972); Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834 (Mo.
1971); Cullor v. Jackson Township, 249 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1952).
74. 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
75. 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966).
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school districts, as political subdivisions of the state under the Missouri
constitution,76 had long been immune from liability in tort for negli-
gence.77 The O'Dell court justified this immunity as conferred by the
sovereign polity on "governmental entities for the performance of tasks
considered essential to their general welfare. ' 78 Moreover, "the immu-
nity of the sovereign people must pass to those governmental entities
which serve the public interest"'79 for those entities to remain viable.80
Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District' demonstrates the pre-
Jones application of the "police power" label to special districts. Plain-
tiff alleged that defendant's negligent maintenance of its drainage ditch
caused injury to his private property. 2 Observing that the district was
a constitutionally created8 3 public corporation, the court distinguished
it from a municipal corporation by emphasizing that maintenance of
drainage ditches furthered the police power goals of public health,
safety, and welfare; thus, the district should share in the state's immu-
nity from liability for negligent maintenance of those ditches.8 4
Like the Metropolitan Sewer District, the State Highway Commis-
sion 5 is a quasi-corporate entity 8 6 Generally, the enabling statutes of
76. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 15 provides: "The term 'other political subdivision,' as used in this
article, shall be construed to include townships, cities, towns, villages, school, road, drainage,
sewer and levee districts and any other public subdivision, public corporation or public quasi-
corporation having the power to tax."
77. See Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S.W. 1050 (1921) (school districts are instru-
mentalities engaged in the performance of governmental functions). See generally Krueger v.
Board of Educ., 310 Mo. 239, 274 S.W. 811 (1925).
78. O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975).
79. 521 S.W.2d at 407.
80. Id.
81. 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964) (en banc).
82. Id. at 350.
83. Id. at 352 (citing Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 30).
84. Id. at 352-53. The court stated that the Sewer District was "an arm of the state exercising
exclusively governmental functions." Id. at 353. Thus, it could not be held liable even for negli-
gent maintenance, control, or regulation of the sewerage ditches and drains under its jurisdiction.
Id. See St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, Inc., No. 60682 (Mo. Nov. 14,
1979) (en banc) ("this court has traditionally denied immunity to municipal corporations for acts
performed in the construction of sewers on the basis that in so acting they are performing a propri-
etary rather than a governmental function. . . [but] sewer districts, which can only act in a gov-
ernmental capacity, do enjoy immunity for performance of these same acts").
85. In Bush v. Highway Comm'n, 329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932), the Missouri Supreme
Court determined that the State Highway Commission is "a subordinate branch of the executive
department." ld. at 853, 46 S.W.2d at 858.
86. Mo. CONsT. art. 4, § 29 provides:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/15
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
quasi-corporations provide that the entity may "sue and be sued in its
official name."' 7 Traditionally, however, the Missouri Supreme Court
has distinguished between waivers of immunity from suit and waivers
from liability.8" This distinction has led to the conclusion that although
the state may be sued, it will not be held tortiously liable in the absence
of an express statutory authorization of the tort action and the payment
of damages.89 Thus, in Bush v. Highway Commissioner90 the court em-
phatically declared that, "The proposition that the State is not subject
to tort liability without its consent is too familiar to deserve extended
citations of authorities."9"
The Tort Immunity Act, by broadly conferring the requisite con-
sent, 2 dramatically changes the liability of a quasi-corporation. Alle-
gations by injured plaintiffs that the Curators of Missouri University
negligently furnished its employee with a dangerous scaffold,93 or that
the State Highway Commission carelessly maintained the shoulder on
a state highway,94 or that the local sewer district heedlessly allowed
erosion to encroach upon private property,9" no longer will be dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action. In the specific instances in
which the Act waives governmental immunity, it abandons the distinc-
tion between quasi- and municipal corporations. The Act thus miti-
gates the irrationality96 of apportioning immunity according to the
The department of highways shall be in charge of a highway commission.. . . It
shall have authority over and power to locate, relocate, design and maintain all state
highways; and authority to construct and reconstruct state highways, subject to limita-
tions and conditions imposed by law as to the manner and means of exercising such
authority; and authority to limit access to, from and across state highways where the
public interest and safety may require, subject to such limitations and conditions as may
be imposed by law.
87. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964); Todd v. Curators
of Mo. Univ., 347 Mo. 460, 147 S.W.2d 1063 (1941); Bush v. Highway Comm'n, 329 Mo. 843, 46
S.W.2d 854 (1932).
88. Bush v. Highway Comm'n, 329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932).
89. Id. at 850, 46 S.W.2d at 857.
90. 329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932).
91. Id. at 850, 46 S.W.2d at 857.
92. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600 (1978); see notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text.
93. Todd v. Curators of Mo. Univ., 347 Mo. 460, 147 S.W.2d 1063 (1941).
94. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
95. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964).
96. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text. Justice Traynor, writing for the California
Supreme Court in Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961) (en banc), clearly articulated this irrationality:
Some who are injured by governmental agencies can recover, others cannot; one injured
while attending a community theater in a public park may recover. . . but one injured
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definition of the political entity that allegedly committed the tort.
From the perspective of the injured party, a broken leg is a broken leg;
where the injury occurred or what political entity caused the injury
should not determine whether the injured party receives compensation.
C. No Waiver of Immunity. Available Litigation Strategies
The Tort Immunity Act expressly waives immunity only for "negli-
gent [or wrongful]97 acts or omissions" 98; it does not confer liability on
the governmental entity for torts in general. In four cases in which the
government's waiver of immunity is uncertain, two litigation options
may be used to counter a claim of governmental immunity.
The first strategy attempts to characterize the public entity's action as
nuisance99 rather than as negligence.'0° A separate body of pre-Jones
case law101 clearly recognizes that the state or its political subdivisions
may be liable for nuisance even though the same governmental entity
in a children's playground may not .... We are asked to affirm a rule that denies
recovery to one injured in a county or hospital district hospital, although recovery may
be had by one injured in a city ... hospital.
Id. at 216-17, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (citations omitted).
97. Mo. REV. STAT § 537.600(2) (1978).
98. Id. § 537.600(1).
99. Interestingly, Rogers v. Kansas City, 327 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), is the only
case in which a Missouri court has found a fire department liable for damages in tort. In Rogers
the fire department maintained a nuisance on its land that injured adjacent property.
100. The philosophical origins of the doctrine of nuisance in Missouri can be traced to Pear-
son v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932). The Pearson court distinguished negli-
gence, "the failure to exercise the degree of care required by the circumstances," from nuisance,
which "does not rest on the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger existing with the best
of care." Id. at 894-95, 55 S.W.2d at 489. See Carpenter v. City of Versailles, 65 S.W.2d 957 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1933) (discharge of sewage upon person's premises may constitute nuisance); see, e.g.,
Kinlough v. City of Maplewood, 201 S.W. 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918); Martin v. City of St. Joseph,
136 Mo. App. 316, 117 S.W. 94 (1909); Martinowsky v. Ci'y of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (1889).
101. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080 (1943). Plaintiff in
Brown alleged nuisance, but the facts only supported negligence; thus, the city successfully as-
serted governmental immunity. Today, a Brown-type case should be brought under Mo. REV.
STAT. § 537.600(2) (1978), because it is a classic case of maintaining property in a negligent condi-
tion.
Regarding nuisance generally, Prosser observed:
One anomaly is the generally accepted view that the municipality is liable if it can be
found to have created or maintained a nuisance, even though it be in the course of an
otherwise "governmental" function .... [Nuisance] rests in many cases upon nothing
more than negligence [and is probably not a rationally supportable distinction]. [Thus,]
resort to the more or less undefined concept of nuisance is merely one method by which
the courts have retreated from municipal nonliability.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 982-83. See also note 100 supra.
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would be immune in a case of mere negligence.'" 2 Illustrative of this
option is Flanigan v. City of Springfteld.03 City residents brought an
action for both personal and property damages caused by the emission
of noxious gas from the city's sludge treatment plant. The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment for plaintiffs, rea-
soning that an action for temporary nuisance is appropriate in cases in
which expert testimony establishes that it is "scientifically possible and
reasonably practicable"" for a city to operate its plant without emit-
ting noxious and harmful gases.10 5
The second strategy to recover from a governmental entity for its
tortious acts is the comparatively new theory of inverse condemnation
or reverse eminent domain. 'I As an exception to the general rule that
"no compensation is payable for consequential damage in eminent do-
main,"'0 7 the theory incorporates "nuisance recovery principles into
eminent domain law."'0 8 In Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dis-
trict, 09 plaintiffs contended that the district "had assumed control over
a natural watercourse and used it for drainage purposes with a result-
ing injury to them.""'  The Missouri Supreme Court denied recovery
on plaintiffs' negligence and nuisance claims. xl The court in dictum,
however, suggested that an inverse condemnation cause of action
would have been recognized.' 2 Inverse condemnation, or reverse emi-
nent domain, is based on the Missouri constitutional provision that for-
102. In Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964), the court, in
dictum, spoke of the "tort of nuisance": "MSD partakes of the state's sovereignty with respect to
tort liability for negligence and there is no logical reason why it should not enjoy the same immu-
nity with respect to the tort of nuisance." Id. at 353. A string of citations to opinions from other
jurisdictions followed the quotation. The dictum did not mention the body of case law referred to
previously, see note 100 supra; text accompanying notes 103-04 infra. These cases, therefore, must
still be controlling on the question of nuisance.
103. 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962).
104. Id. at 704.
105. Id.
106. See Twiehaus v. Wright City, 412 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. 1967); Page v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348, 352-54 (Mo. 1964); Mattingly v. St. Louis County, 569 S.W.2d
251, 251-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See generally Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation. The Constitu-
tional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3; Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation:
Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1969).
107. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 63, at 889.
108. Id.
109. 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964).
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 353-54.
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bids appropriation of a person's property for a public use without
compensation." 3 Although the state typically cannot be sued without
its consent, 114 the state need not statutorily authorize an action in in-
verse condemnation because the alleged injury entails violation by the
state of a person's constitutionally protected interest; the constitutional
provision is self-enforcing."-5 The Page court thus concluded that an
action for inverse condemnation could be brought against "the state as
well as others having the power of eminent domain" 6 including drain-
age districts."'"17
II. IMPACT OF THE TORT IMMUNITY ACT
A. Effect of the Act on Traditionally "Governmental" Functions
The state's police power traditionally has been construed to author-
ize municipalities to incarcerate lawbreakers,"" hospitalize the in-
firm, 19 regulate traffic, 20 enforce the laws, and protect the community
from fire.' 2' Before the Tort Immunity Act, Missouri courts defined
the limits of governmental immunity by the extent to which an activity
promoted the "health, safety and welfare"' 22 of the polity. This stan-
dard, however, was unworkable and amorphous.2 3 The Tort Immu-
Recently, in Mattingly v. St. Louis County, 569 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), the court
reviewed the dismissal of a complaint that stated claims based on tort and inverse condemnation.
The court found the county immune from tort liability, but not from claims of inverse condemna-
tion.
113. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 26 ("private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
withoutjust compensation"). See, e.g., State ex rel State Highway Comm'n v. Swink, 537 S.W.2d
556, 558 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); State ex rel Hausgen v. Allen, 298 Mo. 448, 459-60, 250 S.W. 905,
907 (1923) (en bane).
114. See Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1975); State ex ret State Highway
Comm'n v. Bates, 317 Mo. 696, 296 S.W. 418 (1927).
115. Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448 (1925); see
State ex rel State Highway Comm'n v. Swink, 537 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); Wells v.
State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973); McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co.,
247 Mo. 549, 155 S.W. 411 (1912).
116. 377 S.W.2d at 354 (citing 29 CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 97 (1965)).
117. Id. (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Drainage Dist., 215 Mo. App. 456, 247 S.W. 494
(1923)).
118. See notes 124-28 infra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 129-39 infra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 140-48 infra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 149-54 infra and accompanying text.
122. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
123. Id.
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nity Act will be both more predictable in its application and more
comprehensive in its compensation of victims of governmental torts.
As an inmate of the Missouri State Pententiary, Edgar Glenn obeyed
orders to operate an obviously dangerous and deteriorated machine
and, consequently, sustained injuries necessitating amputation of his
fingers.' 24  In Glenn v. Department of Corrections25 the Department
moved to dismiss Glenn's action for damages on the ground of sover-
eign immunity. The trial court sustained the motion and the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal in light of Ulrich v. City of St.
Louis.126  In Ulrich the superintendent of a city workhouse ordered
plaintiff-inmate to harness a mule, which the superintendent knew to
be vicious. The court denied plaintiffs damages action for injuries sus-
tained when the mule kicked him, because negligence is not compensa-
ble in cases in which defendant is engaged in a governmental
activity.12
7
The Tort Immunity Act undermines both Glenn and Ulrich in that it
waives governmental immunity for injuries caused by a public entity's
negligent maintenance of its property. The Act thus signals increased
accountability for persons charged with maintaining public property
and, more specifically, for wardens and jailers.1 28
Negligently maintained city and county hospitals also will no longer
be shielded from tort liability by the governmental immunity doctrine.
As recently as January 1978, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal of a negligence claim against a county hospital in Hanson
124. Glenn v. Department of Corrections, 434 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1968). Glenn had been or-
dered to wire around the safety button on an automobile license-stamping machine that was evi-
dently out of repair.
125. Id.
126. 112 Mo. 138, 20 S.W. 466 (1892).
127. Id. at 148-49, 20 S.W. at 469.
128. The Tort Immunity Act waives immunity from actions and liability for:
Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes
that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury
directly resulted from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably forseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that
either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within
the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the
injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600(2) (1978).
This waiver, however, does not affect the doctrine of official immunity; Le., to the extent that
either the Glenn or Ulrich court based its denial of liability on the official's discretionary authority,
the decisions are not undermined by the Tort Immunity Act. See note 151 infra.
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v. Pulaski County Memorial Hospital.'29 Without questioning the via-
bility of the sovereign immunity doctrine or citing any authority, the
court applied the principles first enunciated in Schroeder v. City of St.
Louis.130 Plaintiff in Schroeder asserted that the wrongful death of his
infant daughter, a paying patient,' 3 ' resulted from the negligence of
both the city hospital and its doctors. Even though the hospital carried
liability insurance, the court held that the preservation and protection
of public health fell within the city's police powers; thus, the city, the
hospital, and the doctors enjoyed immunity from the action.132
The Schroeder court did not indicate whether plaintiff alleged medi-
cal malpractice or negligent maintenance of hospital property. Apply-
ing the analysis of the Tort Immunity Act advanced above concerning
the immunity vel non of the Department of Corrections, 33 the immu-
nity of hospitals no longer can be perfunctorily presumed; the negligent
maintenance of hospital property will support a damages award to an
injured plaintiff34 just as the negligent maintenance of jail facilities
can result in the imposition of liability.
The Tort Immunity Act, however, will not require a finding of liabil-
ity in all situations. Pitts v. Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center
35
demonstrates that the doctrine of governmental immunity, in a limited
number of circumstances, is a necessary and equitable doctrine. Dece-
dent's wife in Pitts brought an action against the state, the mental
health center, and two of its doctors for the wrongful death of her hus-
band, who had been shot by a former patient. The court conferred
immunity on the hospital as an instrument of the state, recognizing that
a governmental action that breaches no affirmative duty is nontortious
129. 560 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
130. 360 Mo. 293, 228 S.W.2d 677 (1950).
131. The court considered the status of the patient, paying or indigent, as irrelevant. Id. at
293, 228 S.W.2d at 678.
132. See Bullmaster v. City of St. Joseph, 70 Mo. App. 60 (1897) (rules of respondeat superior
do not apply to agents of municipality engaged in performance of a governmental function); see,
e.g., Zummo v. Kansas City, 285 Mo. 222, 225 S.W. 934 (1920); Watrous v. City of St. Louis, 281
S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
133. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
134. The import of the Tort Immunity Act is that if the building, equipment, or other property
of a public hospital is negligently maintained, the public entity will be liable. The Act does not
extend liability to negligent acts or omissions. See note 151 infra. To that extent, the liability of
public hospitals is less than that of charitable hospitals because of the total abrogation of charita-
ble immunity. See Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969). See also Gar-
nier v. St. Andrew Presbyterian Church, 446 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
135. 521 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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even if it harms an individual.'36 The Pitts court, moreover, granted
immunity for an error of medical judgment, not for the negligent main-
tenance of medical facilities. Because the Tort Immunity Act does not
address errors in medical judgment, Pitts should continue to be author-
itative.137
An area related to, but distinguishable from, hospitals is the liability
vel non of ambulances that service a city hospital. Although Missouri
case law never has addressed the issue directly, dicta in Dugan v. Kan-
sas City l indicated that when an ambulance, whether privately or
governmentally owned, services a city hospital, it shares in the hospi-
tal's immunity. The Tort Immunity Act, however, will preempt the
Dugan dicta because the Act categorically waives liability for injuries
arising out of the operation of motor vehicles used in the course of
government employment. 39
The Tort Immunity Act also will affect traffic regulation by the gov-
ernment. Analogizing automatic traffic signals to the policemen of an
earlier era who manually directed traffic through intersections, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court in Prewitt v. City of St. Joseph 140 concluded that
the regulation of traffic and the installation and maintenance of traffic
signals constitute governmental functions.' The legislators and al-
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1979). A tort is the breach of an affirmative
duty that gives rise to an action for damages. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 1.
137. Courts have unanimously recognized that doctors are not liable for mere errors ofjudg-
ments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B, Comment e (1979). See W. PROSSER, supra
note I, at 162-66.
138. 373 S.W.2d 175, 176 n.l (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
139. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600(1) (1978). See note 50 supra.
Before the Tort Immunity Act, Missouri common law extended governmental immunity to city
vehicles. In Cassidy v. City of St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S.W. 306 (1912), a city employee
negligently, and in violation of a city ordinance, left unhitched a team of horses. In the course of
running away, the horses fatally struck a fellow employee. A wrongful death action ensued, but,
denying recovery, the court held that, "The patrol wagon and its driver, the city ambulance with
its driver, the street sweepers with the vehicles and employees that gather the dirt, are all agencies
of the government." Id. at 207, 152 S.W. at 310. The court in Hayes v. City of Kansas City, 362
Mo. 368, 241 S.W.2d 888 (1951) reaffirmed that, "'It is unquestionably the law in this state that
street cleaning is a governmental function for which the city is not liable for negligence in its
performance."' Id. at 371, 241 S.W.2d at 890 (quoting Appellant's Brief). With the abolition of
the governmental-proprietary distinction for injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehi-
cles, the immunity of garbage collectors is also destined for the trash heap.
140. 334 Mo. 1228, 70 S.W.2d 916 (1934).
141. Id. at 1232, 70 S.W.2d at 918. See Watson v. Kansas City, 499 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo.
1973) (en banc):
[T]he placing (or failure to place) of a sign on North Manchester to warn that the inter-
section in question was a T intersection is a form of traffic regulation, direction, or con-
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derpersons who choose the installation sites,142 and correlatively, the
city that maintains them, were immune from liability claims, 43 even
for injury "caused by the disintegration of a stop sign, or for a failure to
keep traffic lights functioning properly,"' 144 unless the city breaches its
duty to barricade or warn of dangerous conditions near a roadway.41
Under the Tort Immunity Act, the governmental entity will continue
to enjoy immunity for injuries that result from the legislative decision
in the location of signals. The Act, however, narrows the scope of im-
munity for cases in which liability is based upon negligent maintenance
of signals. 146 If the facts support a plaintiff's allegations that the public
entity had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerously main-
tained signal, then courts will hold the public entity liable. Further-
more, when faced with the difficulty of establishing the dangerous
condition of the signal, a plaintiff may plead in the alternative that the
defective street signal constitutes a breach by the governmental entity
of its duty to keep streets in a safe condition. 147 This characterization
of the breach is possible because defective traffic signals, as obstruc-
tions, arguably fall within the duty-to-warn exception under the com-
mon law.
148
Not surprisingly, two of the most firmly entrenched immunities ex-
trol, and hence a governmental function. It follows that there would be no liability on
defendant for its alleged negligence in failing to install such a sign on North Manchester.
See also Gillen v. City of St. Louis, 345 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1961).
142. Regarding the immunity that attaches to discretionary lawmaking, see Bean v. City of
Moberly, 350 Mo. 975, 169 S.W.2d 393 (1943) (no liability for failure to make or enforce proper
laws); Moore v. City of Cape Girardeau, 103 Mo. 470, 15 S.W. 755 (1891) (same).
143. That this is not a necessary corollary is manifest by considering Cassidy v. City of St.
Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S.W. 306 (1912), in which the court held that the decision whether and
where to construct a street is purely discretionary, hence governmental, but once a street is con-
structed, its maintenance is purely proprietary. Id.
144. Watson v. Kansas City, 499 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo. 1973) (citing 18 E. MCQUILLAN, MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.42).
145. German v. Kansas City, 512 S.W.2d 135, 143 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) ("submissible case of
negligence on the City's failure to barricade or warn in violation of its duty to keep its streets in a
reasonably safe condition for travel"); Treon v. City of Hamilton, 363 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1963) (city
has duty to warn or barricade newly constructed and dangerously deceptive roadway); Lavinge v.
City of Jefferson, 262 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (city liable for collision occurring outside
traveled portion of highway only if location was inherently dangerous or known by city to be
commonly used); Williams v. City of Mexico, 224 Mo. App. 1224, 34 S.W.2d 992 (1931) (city
negligent for failing to barricade road leading to bridge that had been removed).
146. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600(2) (1978). See note 51 supra.
147. See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
148. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
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tend to police 49 and fire departments.' ° This almost unanimous body
of case law is the result of a consensus that these officers represent not
only the municipality, but the public as well. 5' This rationale, how-
ever, is less persuasive in cases of the careless or reckless use of motor
vehicles by firemen- 2 or policemen.'53 Under the Tort Immunity Act,
in any event, injuries suffered because of the negligent use of any motor
vehicle by any public employee will constitute a cause of action for
which immunity has been waived.' 54
149. In Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1948), plaintiff alleged in part that he
had been assaulted by a policeman while in the city jail, and that the city negligently failed to
exercise due care in its selection and retention of an unqualified and dangerous employee. Id. at
402. The court held that the city did not have an absolate duty to select and retain only safe and
competent police officers; rather, "in its governmental function of maintaining and operating a
police force," it had only a relative duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection and retention
of police officers. Id. at 403. See, e.g. Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080
(1943) (action for wrongful death of husband who burned in city jail; plaintiff alleged actionable
nuisance in city's failure to safely maintain the jail, but court held that immunity attached because
facts could only support negligence claim); Worley v. Inhabitants of Columbia, 88 Mo. 106 (1885)
(action for false arrest; court held that bare allegation of trespass by marshal on the person of
plaintiff does not make out prima facie case against the municipal corporation, which prima facie
is not liable for its wrongful acts); McConnell v. City of St. Charles, 188 Mo. App. 49, 204 S.W.
1075 (1918) (action for false imprisonment for violation of town ordinance prohibiting sale of
meat without a license; court held that because ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
even tortious enforcement of the valid ordinance was immunized).
150. See, e.g., Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Richardson v. City of
Hannibal, 330 Mo. 398, 50 S.W.2d 648 (1932) (en banc); Heller v. Mayor of Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159
(1873); Light v. Lang, 539 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); McKenna v. City of St. Louis, 6 Mo.
App. 320 (1878).
151. See notes 149-50 supra.
The Tort Immunity Act does not address the issue of official immunity. Because the theoretical
bases and the purposes of official immunity differ from those of governmental immunity, a discus-
ion of official immunity is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 522 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (under majority's holding, "the defense of official
immunity [for federal officers] will have been abolished in fact if not in form").
The question of official immunity r'el non, however, should be considered by the plaintiff in
determining available defendants. See, e.g., Clark v. Furch, 567 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (public grade school gym teacher not immune from suit for negligent supervision); Kersey v.
Harbin, 531 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("we know of no general principle of law which
clothes grammar school teachers with immunity from liability for their negligent acts").
152. See Richardson v. City of Hannibal, 330 Mo. 398, 50 S.W.2d 648 (1932) (en bane) (fire-
truck driven on wrong side of road collided with and destroyed parked car).
153. See Statler v. City of Joplin, 189 Mo. App. 383, 176 S.W. 241 (1915) (police officer, who
recklessly drove car that he knew to be mechanically defective, struck and crippled innocent third
party).
154. Mo. REa. STAT. § 537.600(1) (1978). See note 50 supra.
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B. Extension of Liabilityfor "Proprietary"Activities to Quasi-
Corporations
Before Jones, the nonimmunity of municipal corporations extended
to those activities for which the governmental entity most likely would
be negligent; namely, the maintenance of parks and playgrounds and
the construction, maintenance, and repair of streets, curbs, and side-
walks.' 55 Contrary to the majority of jurisdictions, 56 Missouri consid-
ered the maintenance of municipal parks to be a proprietary
function. 5 In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court frequently ac-
knowledged the nondelegable duty of municipal corporations to con-
struct and maintain streets 58 and adjacent curbs and sidewalks' 59 in a
reasonably safe condition. Courts also imposed liability on the munici-
pality if it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition
of a park, street, or sidewalk.' 60
155. See Orlove, Municipal Tort Liability, 15 J. Mo. B. 291 (1959). "[S]idewalks and streets
• . . are the largest areas of litigation as far as municipal litigation is concerned. In Kansas City
90% of the tort cases involve sidewalks and streets." Id. at 293.
In addition to parks, roads, and sidewalks, Missouri common law considered city ownership
and maintenance of an airport a proprietary, not a governmental, function. Behnke v. City of
Moberly, 243 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951). Mo. CONsT. art. 6, § 26(e) provides:
Any city, by vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting thereon, may
incur an indebtedness in an amount not to exceed an additional ten per cent of the value
of the taxable tangible property shown as provided in section 26(b), for the purpose of
paying all or any part of the cost of purchasing or constructing waterworks, electric or
other light plants to be owned exclusively by the city, provided the total general obliga-
tion indebtedness of the city shall not exceed twenty per cent of the assessed valuation.
Thus, these municipal functions are implicitly proprietary. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Kansas City, 351
Mo. 1218, 175 S.W.2d 814 (1943); Burgess v. Kansas City, 259 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App, 1953).
156. See W. PROSSER, supra note I, at 982.
157. Catalano v. Kansas City, 475 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) ("It is conceded that the
defendant City operated this park in a proprietary capacity and that it is required to exercise
ordinary care to maintain such park in a reasonably safe condition."); see Jackson v. City of St.
Louis, 422 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1967); Capp v. City of St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S.W. 616 (1913) (en
banc). Compare note 52 supra with note 61 supra. See also Teaney v. City of St. Joseph, 520
S.W.2d 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
158. See, e.g., Carruthers v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1073, 111 S.W.2d 32 (1937).
159. See, e.g., Hart v. City of Butler, 393 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1965).
160. See Hayes v. City of Kansas City, 362 Mo. 368, 241 S.W.2d 888 (1951).
[A city] has the duty to construct and maintain [streets] in such condition that they will
be reasonably safe for public travel, and therefore, is liable in damages for injuries
caused by negligent construction or by failure to keep them "free from nuisances, de-
fects, and obstructions caused by itself or by third parties if it ... had actual or con-
structive notice thereof in time to abate the nuisance, remove the obstruction or repair
the defect." There can be no question about these well established rules or that the
duties imposed by them are non-delegable duties.
Id. at 371, 241 S.W.2d at 890.
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German v. Kansas City' 6 ' represents the court's most recent encoun-
ter with the issue of road maintenance. The German court found that
inadequate road markings caused plaintiffs collision. 162 Although de-
fendant-city admitted its duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe
condition for travel, the city contended that it was exempt from liability
because plaintiffs complaint related directly to the "regulation and
movement of traffic,"' 163 a governmental function."6  The court, how-
ever, held for plaintiff, finding that the city's failure to warn fell "within
the stated exception to the governmental immunity doctrine."' 65
The Tort Immunity Act will effectively eliminate the governmental-
proprietary distinction that plagued pre-Jones common law. 166 Every
"governmental entity" will be liable in tort in every way that municipal
corporations previously had been liable. In addition, municipal corpo-
rations will be liable for torts arising from a broad range of functions in
which it previously had enjoyed immunity. 167
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 168
A. Scope of Retained Governmental Immunity
Necessitated by the Jones court's abrogation of governmental immu-
161. 512 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); see Myers v. City of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
1962):
[A] city must act with due care, not only to keep the streets free from dangerous condi-
tions but also in doing any act to repair them and maintain them open for traffic, and
under the well-established law of Missouri it is liable for its torts resulting from activities
done in carrying out these duties regardless of the name by which they may be called.
Id. at 19.
162. 512 S.W.2d at 142 (partially obscured yellow lane lines inadequately informed motorists
that four-lane undivided highway was being used temporarily for two-lane, two-way traffic; court
based finding on unsatisfactory number, location, and condition of road signs, or absence of barri-
cade and separation from oncoming traffic lanes).
163. Id. at 141.
164. Id. at 144.
165. Id. at 142. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
166. The dichotomy created by Bailey and Murtaugh, see notes 32-37 supra, stemmed from
classifying immune activities according to which political subdivision engaged in the activity
rather than according to the function of the activity. The Tort Immunity Act extends liability for
certain activities to all political entities.
167. See, e.g., notes 134, 139 supra.
168. To construe the Tort Immunity Act, this part of the Note will invoke several well-settled
principles of statutory construction. See generally J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. C. Sands 1972). If the language of a statute is not clear, plain, and
unambiguous on its face, courts may appropriately use extrinsic aids to assist in its construction.
See Jackson County v. Spradling, 522 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1975); cf. Chapman v. Sanders, 528
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nity, 16 9 the Tort Immunity Act "was intended to be a stop gap mat-
ter."'170 The Act waives immunity only for acts or omissions of public
employees, but fails to define "employee." Only the workers' compen-
sation statute among Missouri laws offers a definition of employee.' 71
This statute includes as employees elected or appointed officials as well
as salaried and wage earning individuals. 72  Because the definition
does not expressly include independent contractors, the rule of statu-
tory construction expressio unis est exclusio alterius 73 compels their ex-
clusion from the provisions of the Act. The status of agents under the
Act remains open to question.
74
The waiver of immunity under the Tort Immunity Act applies to
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (when language of statute is unambiguous and conveys plain and
definite meanings, courts have no business foraging among rules of construction to impose other
meanings). In examining the legislative purpose behind a statute, it is proper for courts to
consider not only acts passed at the same session of the legislature, but also acts passed at both
prior and subsequent sessions. See Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (construction of statute often requires an examination of historical developments of
legislation and related statues). Statutes pertaining to the same subject matter should be
considered as a unit. See Raytown v. Danforth, 560 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1977); State v. Kraus, 530
S.W.2d 684 (Mo. 1975); ITT Canteen Corp. v. Spradling, 526 S.W.2d I 1 (Mo. 1975); Southwest
Foreign Indus., Inc. v. Loehr Employment Serv., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
The Tort Immunity Act should be construed in the light of O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d
403 (Mo.) (en banc), cert denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975), because it recounts the legislative attrition of
governmental immunity in Missouri. This chronicle, id. at 408-09, indicates the probable scope
and intent of the Act. In addition, the Act should be read in pari materia with the provisions that
authorize the acquisition of insurance by municipalities against tort liability in the exercise of
governmental functions, Mo. REv. STAT. § 7 1.185 (1978), the procurement of similar insurance by
the State Highway Commission, id. § 226.092, the extension of workers' compensation to state
employees, id. §§ 105.800- .850, the Executive Branch Liability Insurance program, id. §§ 34.260-
.275, and the Tort Defense Fund provisions, id. § 105.7 10.
169. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). "In order that
. . . the legislature be afforded an opportunity to consider the subject in general, the [sovereign
immunity] doctrine is abrogated prospectively as to all claims arising on or after August 15, 1978."
Id. at 23 1.
170. Letter from Joe D. Holt, Missouri State Representative, Majority Floor Leader and
Sponsor of the Tort Immunity Act, to Michael S. Anderson, January 8, 1979, on file with the
Washington University Law Quarterly. Representative Holt stated that the Tort Immunity Act "is
not intended to be a comprehensive all knowing piece of legislation for the next one hundred
years." Id.
171. Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.800- .850 (1978).
172. Id. § 105.800:
As used in sections 105.800 to 105.850, the term "state employee" means any person who
is an elected or appointed official of the state of Missouri or who is employed by the state
and earns a salary or wage in a position normally requiring the actual performance by
him of duties on behalf of the state.
173. See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 168, at 123-36.
174. Representatives Holt, supra note 170, and Dill, supra note 48, disagree over whether the
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both "real and personal property" of the public entity.'75 The public
entity, therefore, must maintain all its property-whether a playground
or a courthouse-in a safe condition. 7 6
B. Insurance Options
The insurance procedures constitute an important, but confusing,
part of the Tort Immunity Act.' 77  Governmental entities "may
purchase liability insurance for tort claims made"'78 against it, with an
arbitrary $800,000 maximum recovery for claims arising out of a single
occurrence and a $100,000 maximum per person per occurrence.' 79
The Act waives sovereign immunity only to the maximum amounts of
insurance purchased or to the maximum amounts of "any self insur-
ance plan duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdivi-
sions of the state."' 8 ° Plaintiffs may recover compensatory, but not
punitive or exemplary, damages.' 8'
Tort Immunity Act intended "employee" to include agents; Representative Holt maintains that
agents are included, but Representative Dill contends that they are excluded.
175. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.020(11) (1978). This definition derives from a section of the Missouri
Statutes that defines common terms appearing in statutes throughout the code.
176. Tort law has commonly defined the property owners' duty to maintain property in terms
of the intended users. The traditional categories are trespasser, licensee, and invitee, with the
corresponding duty becoming stricter as one moves along the continuum. Common carriers and
innkeepers, moreover, have generally been held to a higher standard of care. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 180-87. It is not unreasonable to inquire whether the state assumes the
same standard of care in the maintenance of its parks and sewers as it assumes in the maintenance
of its governmental buildings and garbage trucks. Representatives Holt, supra note 170, and Dill,
_wpra note 48, agree that the state's duty to the public is identical for all of its property. The duty
assumed is that of a property owner to an invitee; that is, the public entity "is under an affirmative
duty to protect [the people], not only against dangers of which he knows, but also against those
which with reasonable care he might discover." W. PROSSER, upra note 1, at 385. The statute
phrases this duty in terms of "actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 537.600(2) (1978).
177. Representative Holt, supra note 170, explained:
[The Act] has another weakness in that it attempts to create some kind of an insurance
agency between governmental entities who allow themselves to self-insure. That's ridic-
ulous. The strengths of the legislation include that it does restore some measure of im-
munity to government and clouds the issue considerably for anyone who wants to bring
an action between now and the time we can enact a decent piece of legislation.
178. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610(l) (1978).
179. Id. Representatives Holt and Dill agree that these figures were arbitrary. Representative
Dill explained: "It was considered that limits would allow compensation to an injured party at a
satisfactory level in most situations while limiting the total liability of a political subdivision."
Dill, supra note 48.
180. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610(1) (1978).
181. Id § 537.610(3).
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Political subdivisions, upon payment of a license fee to the Director
of Insurance and compliance with certain filing procedures, may join
together for the purpose of creating an entity to provide liability insur-
ance.' 8 2 The Director must approve the articles of the self-insurance
association, issue a license to the association to do business in the
state 183 as a nonprofit corporation, 84 examine amendments to the arti-
cles of incorporation and renew licenses, 185 and take charge of the asso-
ciation if it defaults.'86
Public entities apparently have three options under the Act:
purchase insurance, self-insure, or remain uninsured. The statute pro-
vides that political subdivisions "may" purchase insurance. Bloom v.
Missouri Boardfor Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Survey-
ors187 held that the term "may" in a statute, unless otherwise indicated,
is permissive, not mandatory; moreover, a permissive construction ac-
cords with common usage.'18  The statute also authorizes waiver of sov-
ereign immunity up to the maximum amount of any self-insurance
plan "duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdivision
of the state."'89 The "duly adopted" language clearly militates against
a construction that would deem the political entity to be self-insured as
a matter of law if a commercial insurance policy were not purchased. 90
On the other hand, it could be argued that the legislature did not
intend to leave open this third option to public entities, because to per-
mit a political subdivision to decide whether to insure, and therefore,
whether to waive its sovereign immunity, would be like trusting the cat
to guard the bird cage. To impute this intent to the legislature, how-
ever, would be to ignore that both the House and Senate had identical
182. A letter from Christopher M. Lambrecht, Counsel for the Missouri Division of Insurance,
to Michael S. Anderson, October 26, 1978, on file with Washington University Law Quarterly,
states that the Division has not, per Mo. REv. STAT. § 374.045 (1978), formulated rules and regu-
lations regarding the insurance provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. Further, they "do not con-
template promulgating any such rules in the near future."
183. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.630 (1978).
184. Id. § 537.635.
185. Id. § 537.640.
186. Id. § 537.645.
187. 474 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
188. Cf. Howard v. Banks, 544 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (word "shall" within a statute
is construed to mandate the doing of whatever is required).
189. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.610(1) (1978).
190. As unpersuasive as a "self-insured by default" argument is, both representatives Holt,
supra note 170, and Dill, supra note 48, presume that this was the intent of the legislature.
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bills that would have accomplished the identical wholesale reinstate-
ment of sovereign immunity in a much less circuitous manner.' 9 '
Moreover, it was the political subdivisions that, in the wake of Jones,
clamored for a complete reinstatement of governmental immunity. 92
Nevertheless, the legislature erred when it left the decision whether to
insure with the individual political subdivisions. 93
Although the speedy enactment of the Tort Immunity Act is largely
attributable to the fear that adequate insurance against unlimited lia-
bility would be too costly, it has been impossible to determine reason-
able estimates of the financial impact of insurance provisions on
Missouri and its political subdivisions. 194 Commentators from a previ-
ous generation' 95 generally concluded that, "The tort burden of small
municipalities has been greatly exaggerated."' 196 These conclusions,
191. H.R. 988, 79th General Assembly (1978), and S. 684, 79th General Assembly (1978) both
provided:
Neither the state of Missouri nor any political subdivision of the state is liable in tort
for any of its acts or any act of any of its officials, employees or agents nor is the state or
any political subdivision subject to suit for any tortious conduct it commits or is commit-
ted by any of its officials, employees or agents unless otherwise expressly provided in the
statutes of this state. Any common law rule to the contrary is hereby specifically abro-
gated.
192. Dill, supra note 48.
193. One commentator observed:
The fact that most statutes are permissive rather than mandatory, however, indicates that
the legislatures, too, are not totally committed to shifting the risk of such injuries to
taxpayers. The effect of these statutes, then, is to pass the policy choice on this issue back
to the local governmental entities.
Gibbons, Liabilio ' Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Governments, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 588, 605-06.
194. Christopher M. Lambrecht, supra note 182, stated that the Division of Insurance does not
have sufficient information to estimate the financial impact on the municipalities. Gary S.
Markenson, Deputy Executive Director of the Missouri Municipal League, in a letter to Michael
S. Anderson, January 4, 1979, on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly, wrote, "We
regret to inform you that we do not have the data to respond to your recent inquiries [about the
anticipated financial impact on municipalities]. . . .[W]e doubt that any organization has such
information." Representative Dill, supra note 48, acknowledged that, "The insurance cost to po-
litical subdivisions was the major impetus behind the new legislation." As to specific costs, Repre-
sentative Dill recalls, "Wide variety of estimates were presented on potential insurance costs, but
none were conclusive." Id. Representative Holt, supra note 170, explained that a reasonable
estimate would be impossible because, for example, "[tihe cost would be radically different for the
City of St. Louis than for New Bloomfield, Missouri, and would be considerably different for
Wright County than it would be for St. Louis County."
195. See David & French, Public Tort Liabilio , Administration: Organization, Methods, and
Expense, 9 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1942).
196. Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Munic#?aliies, 9 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 363
(1942).
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however, are suspect. They were based on the dubious premise that the
standard of care is less exacting in smaller cities than in larger ones
because in small cities people presumably have greater knowledge of
street or sidewalk defects and thus would be contributorily negligent if
injured by the disrepair. 97
Recent studies paint a much more sobering picture of both the stan-
dard of care and the cost of insurance. 9 ' In 1967 Oregon established
maximum recoveries of $25,000 per claimant for destruction of prop-
erty in one occurrence, $50,000 for other damages to a claimant per
occurrence, and $300,000 for all claims arising out of a single occur-
rence.' 99 Although these maximums were significantly lower than the
recovery limits of the Tort Immunity Act,2"' Portland was the only en-
tity large enough to absorb the risks of self-insurance.20' In 1975 Ore-
gon raised the maximum limits to $50,000, $100,000, and $300,000,202
respectively, at which time liability premiums rose as much as five hun-
dred percent over 1974.203 The experience of Oregon teaches that the
cost of assuming even limited tort liability should not be minimized,
and the option of self-insurance is a feasible alternative only for very
large cities.
197. See id at 364. "The standard of care required of small municipalities differs, in practice,
considerably from that required of large municipalities. It is common knowledge that streets are
not kept in good repair. Sidewalks frequently are non-existent. One who is injured because of a
sidewalk or street defect is considered careless." Id. Those days are no more, as Representative
Dill, supra note 57, explained: "Years ago, government was a comparatively small enterprise
having little effect on the day to day living of the Citizens. Today, with government at all levels
expanding and getting into an ever increasing variety of enterprises, the potential for citizen injury
.by public employees is greatly expanding."
198. For a more optimistic forecast of the government's ability to pay, see Note, An Insurance
Program to Effectuate Waiver of Sovereign Tort Immunity, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 89, 90-91 (1973).
199. See NAAG REPORT, supra note 3, at 81.
200. $100,000 per person and $800,000 per occurrence; see note 179 supra and accompanying
text.
201. See NAAG REPORT, supra note 3, at 83. According to the COMMERCIAL ATLAS & MAR-
KETING GUIDE (Rand McNally & Co. 110th ed. 1979), Portland's estimated 1979 population is
368,000 (1,154,500 metropolitan area). The only cities in Missouri as large or larger than Portland
are St. Louis, 489,000 (2,380,700 metropolitan area) and Kansas City, 438,000 (1,291,900 metro-
politan area).
202. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1977).
203. See NAAG REPORT, supra note 3, at 83.
Colorado limits liability to $100,000 per claim and $300,000 per occurrence (as compared with
Missouri's $800,000 maximum per occurrence). Figures for the two-year period from 1975 to 1977
show that, "Costs for the program mentioned above are rising quickly, with insurance premiums
skyrocketing." Id. at 87.
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C. Critical Evaluation
One criticism of the Tort Immunity Act is that the absence of a pro-
vision for out-of-court settlements will lead to the litigation of each tort
claim against a public entity. Because two bills that would have ex-
pressly authorized out-of-court settlements2" were defeated at the
same time that the Tort Immunity Act was under consideration, it can-
not be presumed that the authority to settle out-of-court is incidental to
the waiver of immunity. To the contrary, the clear implication is that
out-of-court settlements are not permitted under the Act. The Tort Im-
munity Act thus completely disregards the economics of litigation-
avoidance.
The Act also fails to explain how a small county or municipality can
afford to pay what could easily be a budget-wrecking judgment. Ar-
guably, an entity's decision to be self-insured implicitly evidences an
intent to satisfy a judgment, if necessary, by means of a bond issue20 5 or
an increase in the ad valorem tax. Clearly, however, authority to tax
beyond the stated legal limit or to pay judgments by installments can-
not be inferred from the Act. House Bill 886 would have authorized a
unit of government that was not fully covered by liability insurance to
levy an ad valorem tax at a rate, if found by the unit of government to
be necessary, in excess of any legal limit otherwise applicable except as
may be imposed by the Constitution of Missouri,2 °6 and would have
authorized a governmental unit to pay a judgment over a period of not
more than five years in equal annual installments plus interest on the
unpaid balance at the rate provided by law, if the judgment exceeded
one percent of the budgeted tax funds for the fiscal year.207 Neverthe-
204. H.R. 886, 79th General Assembly (1978); H.R. 1505, 79th General Assembly (1978).
H.R. 886, § 12 authorized: "A cause of action brought under this act may be settled and compro-
mised [when it] . . . would be in the best interest of the unit of government."
205. Warp suggests that municipalities probably would not need to avail themselves of this
alternative:
The need for protecting small municipalities from occasional large claims is more theo-
retical than real. It is easy to say that a $10,000judgment against a village or town of 300
inhabitants would throw that village or town into bankruptcy. While such a judgment
could probably be paid off with minimum hardship by means of a bond issue, the fact is
that, to this writer's knowledge, such judgments are nonexistent.
Warp, supra note 196, at 366.
If this analysis was ever valid, its persuasiveness is fatally undermined when one subjects
Warp's hypothetical town of 300 residents to a potential $800,000 judgment; see note 179 supra
and accompanying text.
206. H.R. 886, 79th General Assembly, § 13 (1978).
207. Id.
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less, political subdivisions must inherently possess the authority to raise
extraordinary funds to satisfy unbudgeted tort judgments and to miti-
gate the budgetary shock of one or more sizable judgments against a
governmental entity during a single fiscal year. Either or both of these
authorizations are necessary to prevent the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity from bankrupting political subdivisions that rightly or wrongly de-
cide to self-insure.
The Act also creates an unnecessary ambiguity through its failure to
address the status of causes of action that accrued in the period be-
tween the Jones decision and the passage of the Tort Immunity Act.208
Because Jones purported to abrogate sovereign immunity in toto and
the Act effects a waiver in certain circumstances, the equities weigh in
favor of permitting those causes of action which otherwise would be
cognizable under the Act. Gray v. State,2°9 however, held that statutes
will be construed to operate prospectively unless a legislative intent to
the contrary is either clear on the face of the statute or necessarily im-
plicit in its provisions. Moreover, because the Tort Immunity Act is in
derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed. 210 This ambi-
guity, therefore, may inequitably prejudice those claims which accrued
during the period between judicial abrogation and legislative reenact-
ment of sovereign immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tort Immunity Act represents a compromise on the issue of gov-
ernmental immunity for torts committed by political entities. Most
negligent torts of governmental entities will find their way into the
courts under one of the two broad waivers found in the Act, 21 but
recoveries will be limited to the stated maximums.
As a hastily drafted piece of legislation, the Tort Immunity Act is
flawed by omissions and ambiguities that subsequent legislatures and
courts should clarify to effectuate the policies embodied in the current
statute. In the meanwhile, the substantive policies within the Act rep-
208. This period extends over eleven months. Jones was decided September 12, 1977; the Tort
Immunity Act went into effect August 13, 1978.
209. 524 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); accord, Brown v. State, 509 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974).
210. See Watkins v. Wattle, 558 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
211. See, e.g., note 155 supra.
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resent a reasoned effort to deal with a problem far more complex than
"the king can do no wrong."
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